Popper on the quasi-inductve process

Science clearly involves some degree of induction; it served the scientific endeavour well for thousands of years. So, how does Popper propose to improve scientific discovery by integrating deduction into the scientific process? Here he is, putting it all together:

The quasi-inductive process should be envisaged as follows. Theories of some level of universality are proposed, and deductively tested; after that, theories of a higher level or universality are proposed, and in their turn tested with the help of those of the previous levels of universality, and so on. The methods of testing are invariably based on deductive inferences from the higher to the lower level; on the other hand, the levels of universality are reached, in the order of time, by proceeding from lower to higher levels.
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959)
85. The path of science. pp. 276-7

A quite simple process. One which takes into account the knowledge we already have (induction) and modifies it as necessary (by adding deduction). It's internally consistent. Does that count as meta-scientific philosophy?